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Military Organizations and Mass Mobilization 
in the Chinese Soviet Republic* 
by Myung Chey** 
The fundamental question. of a revolution is to seIze the reIgns of 
government. Violence is a necessary means to eradicate the rule of the 
landlord and bourgeois class .... In order to seize and consolidate political 
power, it is necessary to organize the army of our own class. 
Cheng·chih kung·tso chiang·shou ta·kang(November 25, 1933) 
In all practical work of our party, correct leadership can only be developed 
on the principle of 'from the masses.' This means summing up, i.e., views 
scattered and unsystemic then taking the resulting ideas back to the masses, 
explaining them and popularizjng them until the masses embrace (these] 
ideas as their own, stand up for them, and translate them into action by 
way of testing their correctness. Then it is necessary once more to sum up 
the views of th" masses and once again take the resulting idee,S back to the 
masses so that the masses give them their wholeheartedsupport. ... and SO on 
,over and over again. Mao Tse·tung (1943) 
Actually the Soviet is a system of government which will enable the 
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 'liT orkshop on "Chi 
nese Communist Rural Bases, 1922""1949," held at Fairbank Center for 
East Asian Research, Harvard University, on 14-21, August, 1978. 
The author wishes to thank Professor George T. Yu of the University 
of Illinois who read the original manuscript of this paper and made Yal-
uable comments. He is also indebted to Professor Ilpyong Kim of the 
University of Connecticut! and Mr. C.P. Chen of the Center for Chinese 
Studies, University of California, Berkeley, for assistance in the research. 
** Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, College of Social 
Sciences 
( 116 ) 
masses of people to participate directly in the policy-making process. The 
basic principle of soviet govern men t is, therefore, to provide the workers, 
peasants, solidiers, and all toiling masses opportunities to participate m 
political processes and to express their own will. 
Lo Fu (1933) 
I. Introduction 
This paper concerns the military organizational techniques of the-
Chinese Soviet Republic, as they emerged and took shape in the Soviet 
area of South-Central China, whose center was Kiangsi. Attempts will 
be made to analyse the military organizations of the Republic and its 
mass mobilization techniques in the Red Army expansion campaigns. 
The organizational techniques of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP; 
during the Chinese Soviet Republic were the products of its uwque 
experience of revolutionary struggle in the Soviet area. The crippling 
defeat of the CCP in 1927 brought the Communist movement close to 
annihilation. However, the debacle had led :Mao Tse-tung ,md his asso-
ciates to reassess the Party's approach to war and revolution and to 
pave the way for a new line of the peasantry emphasizing a combina-
tion of armed insurrection and agrarian revolution. 
The principal policies formulated during this period primarily aimed 
at preserving the Soviet political system. Confronted with a series of 
"encirclement" campaigns launched by the Kuomintang (KMT) forces, 
the Chinese Soviet Republic like other revolutionary systems elsewhere 
. in the world needed conscious efforts to survive. In order to survive, 
the Communist leaders headed by Mao Tse-tung adopted the organiza-
tional techniques of military mobilization and mass mobilization and 
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participation. These techniques were based on the principle of the "mass 
line." The principle means summing up the views of the masses then 
taking the resulting ideas back to them so that the masses give their 
wholeheartec support to the Communist leadership. It is a set of tech-
niques for arousing the masses.· The Communist leaders learned the 
les~on that ·without mass support they could not survive. 
In the history of the Chinese Communist movement the Chinese 
Soviet Republic may be regarded as a failure, because the leaders of 
the Republic had no choice but to abandon their initial policies of 
agrarian revolution and armed insurrection in favor of an anti-Japanese 
united front and a new democracy. However, Mao's concept of the 
mass line and mass mobilization was first developed during the Kiangsi 
experience. And it became the foundation of the mass line politics 
during the Yenan period as well as the post-1949 years.!1 
There are other reasons for analyzing the military organizations and 
mass mobilization of the Kiangsi era. We have two underlying hypoth-
eses in this paper. The first hypothesis is that the Chinese Communist 
revolution was basically military in its character. The ultimate success 
of the movement was to be achieved by military means. In discussing 
the origins of Communist victory in China, therefore, the military 
aspects of the movement can hardly be negleCted. The military 'Organi-
zations which took shape together with the policy of tbe Red Army 
1) For the continuity of the :nass line, see for example Male Selden, "The 
YenaE Legacy: The Mass Line," in A. Doak Barnctt':ed.;, Chinese Com-
muni st Politics in Action (Seattle: University of \Vashington Press, 1969) 
pp. ~S'-l:;l; and Ilpyong J. Kim, The Politics of ChiJlCSe Communism: 
Kiangsi under the Soviets (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1973), p. 119. See also Mark Selden, The Yenan Way 
in Revolutionary China (Clmbridge, Mass.: Harvard University Pres~, 
19m. 
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expanSIOn initiated during the Kiangsi period provided thc Communist 
leaders with a rich experience. And this experience finally constituted 
a decisive factor in the ultimate success of communism in China. The 
second ,hypothesis is that China's basic social conHict was rural. The 
two opposing sides were the peasant masses and the landed upper class. 
To a certain extent, the agrarian revolution reflected intra party power 
relations. However, it was ultimately a means of exploiting the social 
conflict by differentiating the masses from the enemy class. The mass 
line policy was developed to win over the masses so that they might 
participate in the Red Army expansion and support the Party's leader-
ship. 
II. The Organizational Goal of the Chinese 
Soviet Republic 
An organization must have three components: organizational goals" 
organizational techniques to achieve its goals, and members who have 
a certain degree of consensus on the goals and who work for the goals_ 
These three components are closely interrelated. 
The Kiangsi period witnessed the process in which the CCP as a 
political organization was pursuing the organizational goals of the Soviet 
revolution. In the Soviet area which was encircled by the KMT forces, 
the Communist leaders made relentless efforts to expand the . peasant 
masses who were required to support their goals through the organiza-
tional techniques of the mass line. Therefore, it is necessary to review 
the organizational goals of the Chinese Soviet Republic before we dis-
cuss on its military organizations and its organizational techniques. 
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The ultimate goal of the CCP during the Kiangsi period was the 
achievement of a socialist revolution under the proletarian dictatorship. 
Since this was the ultimate goal, there were two short term goals that 
had to be pursued before the achievement of the ultimate goal. In the 
report delivered at the Central Executive Committee of the Second 
National Soviet Congress, Mao Tse-tung commented on the revolutionary 
situation in China. 
The .central factors in the present Chinese situation are widespread civil 
war, a life and death struggle between revolution and counter-revolution, 
and a sharp antagonism between the Soviet regime of workers and peasants 
and the landlord -bourgeois KMT regime. 21 
In other words, Mao viewed China's revolutionary situation as being 
at the crucial stage of class struggle between revolution and counter-
revolution. From this point of view, the CCP's basic line was decided 
upon. Namely, the basic line was aiming at destroying the encirclement 
campaigns of the KMT and to preserve and expand the Soviet political 
system. ~lao continued: 
The Soviet regime is now faced with "the historic task of orgalllzmg and 
leading all the revolutionary masses ... of mobilizing the broad worker-peasant 
masses to join the Red Army, of enlarging the local armed fOeces and gUer-
rilla units .. _ of developing the class struggle along the working masses_ .. of 
developing agrarian struggle of the peasants, of mobilizing the broad 
2) Mao Tse-tung, "Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo chung-yang chi{l-hsing 
wei-yuan-hui yu jen-min wei-yuan-hui tui ti-erh-tz'u ch"cian-kuo w-wei-ai 
tai-piao ta-hui ti pao-kao," Hung-se Chung-hua (Red China, hereafter 
cited as HSCH) , Special Ed_ of the Second National Soviet Congress, 
No. 3 (January 26, 1934). An extract of this report may be found in 
Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and John K. Fairbank,.4. Documentary 
History of Chinese Communism (New York: Atheneum, 1956;, pp.226-
239. 
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peasant masses to tight fc~ the acquisition and protection of the lanci, finally, 
calling upon all proletarian, peasant, and laboring masses of the soviet areas 
and throughout Chi~Fl to fight to the utmost imd at all costs in the revolu-
tionary war. 3) 
Thus, the basic line of the Party at thi~ period was aimed at destroy-
ing the landlord-bourgeois KMT regime through revolutionary warfare 
and preserving and expanding the Soviet regime through class struggle. 
This means that Chim,' s revolutionary situation had bee,l changed from 
a stage of "a crucial moment of the rising tide of revolution" into a 
stage of "revolutionary crisis. "4) Therefore, the techniques of military 
organizations and m2SS mobilization developed during the Kiangsi era 
must be understood within the context of the revolutionary situation 
which was perceived by Mao and his associates. 
HI. The Red Army Organizations 
It was during the Kiangsi period that the Chinese Communist leaders 
acquired control of a definite geographic area of approximately 40 thou-
sand square kilometers and a population of 12 to 15 million people. 3 ) 
3~ Ibid. 
,JJ Tso-Jiang Hsiao, Power Relations within the Chinese Communist }'fovement, 
1.930-1984: A. Study of Documents (Seattle: University of vVad]ington 
Press, 1961), pp.253-26/l, 
,:) The geographie eKte1:'~t ilnd population of the Soviet area during the 
Kiangsi period varies lrom time to tiIne. For the size of the territory, 
see '';P'eng~p'e:ag P'Q"p'o ti chung-kuo. sll'-wei-ai TUn-tung," 'Hung-ch'i 
chou-pao(Red FL:g \'ieeldy), No. 2/1 (November 27, 1931), 1ll 
N·I k' 1 . I ' . 'd' C' k k .. 110n go U~3al 1TIOnc.J.l :ellKyU]O ,€- .), flUgO It yosanto slu shzrvosu 
(Collected IVlaterials of the History ·0£ the Chinese Communist P;rty, 
bereafter cite; (\s Chugoku kyo santo ski) (Tokyo! Keisoshobo, 1972), Vol. 
5, pp.352-3Ci3. For ~he population, see Kim, The Polit£cs of Chinese 
Communism, p. Il~l. Sec abo Trygve Lt,tveit, Chinese Communism, 193.l-
1934: ExperiC!:cc in Civil Government (Lllnd, Sweden:. Studentlitteratur, 
1973), Pl'. :OH!. 
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Therefore, the organizational goal of the Red Army was to preserve 
and expand the Soviet political system of workers' and peasants' demo-
cratic dictatorship. And at the same time, the Communist leaders viewed 
the Red Army as the protector of the Soviet system and they identified 
its organization with the Soviet system itself.6) 
According to the "Resolution on the Question of the Red Army," 
adopted at the First National Soviet Congress in November, 1931, "the 
Red Army is the most important protector of the Soviet regime. It is 
the class army and it is differentiated from the army of the KMT 
warlords and imperialism both in its tasks and spirit. The army of 
warlords and imperialism, being separated from the masses, is the 
tool of waging war of expanding colony in which the workers and 
peasants are oppressed. It is engaged in the war of aggression ... _ On 
the other hand, the Red Army is the army of the worker-peasant masses 
themselves and the armed forces of liberating the worker-peasant 
masses." 7) 
Therefore, the important and urgent task of the Chinese Soviet Re-
public during the Kiangsi period was the building of the Red Army. 
The Red Army of the Soviet area comprised two types of troops. One 
was the regular army, known as Chung-kuo kung-nunghung-cTliin (the 
'-Yorkers' and Peasants' Red Army). The other was the local armed 
forces, consisting of the Red Guards, the Youth Vanguards, and the 
Red Army Recruit Corps. 
Upon the recommendation of Chou En-lai, then the chief of the po-
---_ ... _.- ._--
6) Ho Ch'ang, "Hung-chiin ch'iian-kuo cheng-chih kung-tso hui -i," Tou-cheng 
(Struggle), Vol. 46 (February 9, 1934). 
7) "Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-nung-ping ti-i-tz'u ch'iian-kuo tai-piao ta-hui 
chueh-i-an (November, 1931)," in Chugoku kyosanto shi, Vol. 5, p.473. 
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litical commissars in the Red Army, the Chinese Soviet Republic prom-
ulgated the "Provisional Organization Charter of the Chinese Workers' 
and Peasants' Red Army" in June, 1933. It is with ·the promulgation 
of this charter that the Red Army· was reorganized under a unified 
system. The important contents of this unified organizational system of 
the Red Army can be summerized as follows: (1) for the first time, 
the heads of the Red Army units were fully empowered to command· 
their respective units; (2) the relationships among various departments 
within the army units were clearly established; (3) branches of the army 
were institutionalized (e.g., the three-three system of the infantry divi-
sions was adopted.); and C 4)· combat organizations of the lower level 
were strengthened. 8 ) 
However, it was III the local armed forces that the organizational 
techniques for mobilization of the masses were most significantly uti-
lized, although the regular forces provided the local armed forces with 
the organizing leadership. 
The Red Guards was perhaps the most important local armed forces. 
It was a kind of militia force consisting of worker-peasant labor masses. 
Unlike the regular forces, recruitment to the Red Guards v.-as extended 
to all persons of ages between eighteen and forty regardless of sex. But 
those who were members of the Youth Vanguards were exempt from 
recruitment to the Red Guards. 
The form of organization of the Red Guards was. almost similar to 
that of the regular Red Army.9) Each hsien had an army unit (chiln). 
8) Wang Chien-min, Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang shih-kao(Historical Materials 
of the Chinese Communist Party, hereafter cited as Chung-kung shih-kao) 
(Taipei, 1965),· Vol. 2, p.451. 
9) For the organization of the regular Red Army, see ibid., pp.451-432. 
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A division was organized in every three districts (ch'u) , a regiment in 
each district, and a battalion in each hsiang. A battalion was divided 
into two to Jive companies, each of which consisted of three platoons. 
Again a platoon was divided into three to five squads, each of which 
consisted of ten to fifteen persons. And in cities, workers were organized 
as independent workers' Red Guards.1°1 
The Red Guards kept a close link with the regular army and was 
subject to the military districts (chun-ch'u) of the Red Army. The head 
of the hsien military department was concurrently the head of the Red-
Guard army, and the secretary of the hsien Party committee was con-
currently its political commissar. The heads of divisions were recruited 
among chiefs of certain ch'u military department. The division political 
commissars were appointed by the political department of the military 
districts from secretaries of certain ch'ii Party committee. 
The head of the district military department was concurrently the 
head of the Red Guards battalion and the secretary of the district Party 
committee held the portfolio of the political commissar of the battalion. 
The heads of the Red Guards companies, platoons, and squads were 
appointed by the hsien military department upon the recommendation 
of the district military department. All units had some political person-
nel at every level of the hierarchy. 
In addition to being engaged in production work, the Red Guards 
were supposed to assist the activities of the regular forces and to work 
. for the strengthening and developing of the Soviet areas. Particularly, 
the model divisions and battalions of the Red Guards frequently partic-
10) "Chung-yang chih-hsing wei·yuan hui kuan-yu k'uo-ta hung-chun wen-t'i 
hsun-ling," HSCH, No. 34 (September 20, 1932).· 
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ipated in guerrilla activities without being engaged in production work. 
The lower cadres of the Red Guards organized local activists and trai-
ned them to join the regular army. 
The Youth Vanguards of the Soviet area began to be organized under 
the leadership of the Communist Youth Corps soon after the Fourth 
Central Committee Plenum of January, 1931. At the end of 1931, the 
First Youth Vanguards Congress of the Soviet area was held and it 
passed two important documents concerning its role and organization. 
They were the "Character and Future Work of the Youth Vanguards 
of the Soviet Area" and the "Constitution of the Youth Vanguards of 
the Soviet Area. "11) 
However, it was not until the adoption of the "Resolution Concerning 
the Youth Vanguards of the Soviet Area" by the Communist Youth 
Corps in June, 1932, that the role and task of the Youth Vanguards 
'were more specified. And its organization and form were unified with 
the promulgation of the "Regulations Governing the Organization of 
all level Corps (Department) of the Youth Vanguards of the Soviet 
Area" in March, 1933. 12) 
The Youth Vanguards were an organization for militarizing the youth 
masses of worker-peasant labor class. It was it support organization of 
the Communist Youth Corps and a reserve force of the Red Army. The 
Youth Vanguards had three important tasks: first, to strengthen and 
expand the Red Army and to participate in the struggle of land revo-
lution and anti-imperialism; second, to struggle for the particular de-
mands of the youth and to defend the struggle of the youth; and third, 
11) "Su-ch'ii shao-hsien-tui ko-chi tui-pu tsu-chih tiao-li(March 23, 1933)", in 
Ckugoku kyosanto ski (1973), Vol. 6, p. 232. 
12) Ibid_, pp.232-234. 
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to engage m a broad Communist education. 13) 
The Youth Vanguards were recruited not only from the working 
class youth and the poor and tenent peasant youth but also from the 
middle peasant youth. One can find the fact that by 1933 the Com-
munist leaders had included the middle peasants into the camp of friends. 
In any event, young persons of ages between sixteen to twenty three 
were compelled to join the Youth Vanguards. 
The organizational principle of the Youth Vanguards was that of 
centralism. The lower units were under the strict control of the higher 
units in its hierarchy. Although the battalion was the basic organi-
zational unit of the Youth Vanguards, the highest unit was the Central 
General Corps Department, under which the provincial corps depart-
ment; the hsien corps department, the ch'u corps department and the 
battalion department were hierarchically organized. 14) 
Like the Red Guards, the model battalion of the Youth Vanguards 
was organized in each ch'u. The model battalion carried out the Red 
Army's strategy, assisted the Red Army's military operation, engaged 
in guerrilla activities, consolidated the Soviet base, and made efforts to· 
develop new Soviet areas. 
The Red Army Recruit Corps was also a local armed force. Its mam 
task was to fill vacancies in the regular army which was engaged in war 
in the front. It participa1;ed in the expansion campaigns of the Red 
Army and trained newly recruited Red Army soldiers. The Red Army 
Recruit Corps was developed through the recruiting experience of the 
Red Guards and the Youth Vanguards. When the cadres of the Red 
13) Ibid., p.232 (Art. 1). 
14) For the organization of the Youth Vanguards in detail, see ibid.,pp.233-
234. (Art. (HJ). 
( 126 ) 
Guards trained its rank and file, they had them Jom the Red Army in 
close cooperation with the local "Support the Red Army Committee." 
Also, it was one of the Youth Vanguards' practices to have its rank 
and file enter the Red Army. These practices of the Red Guards and 
the Youth Vanguards later developed into the organization of the Red 
Army Recruit Corps. By 1932, the Red Army Recruit Corps was organ-
ized in each hsien. The larger size of the corps had the scale ofa 
regiment, the smaller one a company. In the Red Army Recruit Corps, 
the members had to receive a short term military and political education 
before joining the regular army.15) 
For the Communist leaders during the Kiangsi period, to organize the 
local armed forces was to secure broad recruit sources of the Red Army. 
Therefore, the Communist Party branches of all levels had to streng-
then the leadership in the Red Guards and the Youth Vanguards. Par-
ticularly, they emphasized the Party's work toward model battalions of 
the Red Guards and the Youth Vanguards. At that time, the Communist 
leaders set up a system of communication between the combat troops in 
the front and the masses in rear, especially the local armed forces. 
"The news of victories in the front and of lives of the Red soldiers 
must be at any time transmitted to the local masses, particularly to the 
Red Guards and the Y outh Vanguards. At the same time, by reflecting 
the situations of the rear area to the front, we must elevate more and 
more the Red soldiers' will to fight in the front arid also heighten 
all the more the broad masses' support for the Red Army and 
15) "Chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan-hui ti-shih-wu hao hsun-ling kuan-yu 
chi'hsu kai-tsao ti-fang su-wei-ai cheng-fu wen-t'i," HSCH, No. 35 (Sep-
tember 27, 1932) and Chung-kuo kung-nung hung-chun tsung cheng-chih-
pu (eeL), Chung·kul) kung-nung hung-chan (July, 1932), pp.7-8. 
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their enthusiasm to join the Red Army." 16) In short, the Communist 
leaders organized the local armed forces in order to mobilize the broad 
masses. 
IV. The Red Army Expansion Campaigns and 
Mass Mobilization 
Throughout the Kiangsi period, the Communist leaders were desper-
ately concerned with the expansion of the Red Army. For the Commu-
nist leaders, in fact, one of the central tasks of the Soviet system was to 
lead and develop the revolutionary war. Therefore, all kinds of works 
had to be carried to win the warY) In the "Directive concerning the 
Question of Expansion of the Red Army"issued by the Central Execu-
tive Committee of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese 
Soviet Republic in September, 1932, the Communist regime expressed 
the importance of strengthening its military forces. "It is now a period 
of a revolutionary war. The Red Army is the field army which is 
engaged in :military activities in the front. The Red Guards and the 
Youel Vanguards are not only the armed organizations of the broad 
masses, but also the defense and recruit forces that strengthen the 
Soviet district from which the Red Army soldiers are recruited. The 
regular forces of the Red Army is supposed to use military strength 
whereas the Red Guards and the Youth Vanguards to reserve it."J8) 
16) "Kuan-yLL k'uo-ta hung-chun ti chlieh-i," Tou-cheng No. 19 (July 25, 
1~1:33) . 
17) "Chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan-hui ti-shih-wu hao hsun-ling kuan-yu 
chi-hsu kai-tsao ii-fang su-wei-ai cheng-fu wen-fi," HSCH, No. 35(Sep-
tember 27, 19:32.). 
18) "Chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan-hui kuan-yii k'uo-ta hung-chun wen-t'i 
hsun-ling," HSCH, No. 34 (September 20, 1932). 
= 128 J 
In order to preserve the Soviet political system, the Kiangsi govern-
ment gave a top priority to the policy of expanding the Red Army. 
The regime issued a number of directives and resolutions concerning 
the expansion of the Red Army and demanded that all personnel in 
the Party, the government, the army. and the mass organizations take 
the expansIOn movement into the most important and urgent considera-
tion. 
After the third "encirclement" campaIgn of the KMT forces in 1931, 
the Soviet regime launched a series ()f Red Army expansion campaigns 
aimed at recruiting "one million iron Red Army soldiers." In December, 
1931. the Central Bureau of the CCP adopted a "Resolution on the 
Question of the Red Army Expansion." In September of the following 
year, the Soviet regime issued a directive on the expansion of the Red 
Army_ It is with the issuance of this directive that the Soviet regIme 
began to take a census and subsequently to organize the Red Guards 
and the Youth Vanguards. Again in June, 1933. the Party's Central 
Bureau adopted a "Resolution Concerning the Expansion of the Red 
Army",19) in which the mobilization of the workers' and the peasants' 
masses to join the Red Army was reemphasized. 
It is in the field of the Red Army expansion movement that the Com-
munist leaders most fully utilized their organizational techniques of 
mass mobilization. Since the Red Army was in reality "the armed 
forces of the masses themselves to lead the national revolutionary war 
against imperialism," the Soviet regIme froaoe incessant efforts to 
absorb and orgamze the worker-peasant masses in the Soviet area as 
19) "Kuan-yli k'uo-ta. hung-chlin ti chueh-i," Tau-cheng, No. 19 (Julv ')" , \, , ~C), 
1933) , 
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well as the w hi te area to join the Red Army. 20, 
According to a direcdve concerning the expansion of the Red Army, 
issued by the Central Executive Committee of the Provisional Central 
Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic, the source of the Red 
Army consisted of the following elements: the broad worker-peasant 
masses in the Soviet district and all the toiling masses, the broad peas-
ants and sufferers who had been exploited by the KMT, warlords, 
and landlords, the volunteer soldiers of anti-imperialism and anti-KMT, 
and again the revolutionary soldiers in the white army.21) 
As Ho Ch' ang, then Deputy Director of the General Political Depart-
ment of the Red Army, reported, the social background of the Red 
Army soldiers in the First Front Army showed that the workers occu-
pied 30 percent, the peasants 67 percent, the office workers 1. 6 percent, 
and others 1. 1 percent by September, 1933. 221 This meant that 97 
percent of the Red Army soldiers had been recruited from the working 
and peasant class. Therefore, it is quite natural that the Communist 
leaders utilized the organizational techniques of mass mobilization in 
their campaigns to expand the Red Army. 
Among a series of the Red Army expansion campaigns, the first was 
launched in November, 1931. Two important resolutions concerning 
the Red Army expansion were adopted at the First Congress of the 




"Kuan-yU hung-chUn wen-t'j chiieh-i ti-erh-tz'u ch'iian-kuQ su-wei-ai tai-piao 
ta-hui fung-kuo (January, 1934)," HSCH, Ko. 152 (Februay 20, 1934). 
"Chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yiian-hui kuan-yu k'uo-ta hung-chun wen-
t'i hsiin-ling," HSCH, No. 34 (September 20, 1932). 
Ho Ch'ang, "Hung-chiin ch'iian-kuo cheng-chih kung-tso hui-i," Tou-
cheng, No. ,16 (February 9, 1934). 
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Congress respectively in November, 1931. 23) The Red Army expanSIOn 
movement began to be materialized with the adoption of these two 
resolu tions. 24) 
It is here that the quality as well as the quantity of the Red Army 
soldiers were emphasized. The resolutions put emphasis on political 
education and leadership in the army in order to raise the quality of 
the soldiers. To this end, the regime demanded the strengthening of 
the army units. And the position and role of political commissars were 
more clearly defined. Also, the relationship between the Party organi· 
zation within the army units and independent political organization of 
the army was redefined. 
According to the December 25th resolution on the expanSIOn of 
the Red Army, the Party's Central Bureau specifically instructed the 
following: (1) during the first three months of 1932, the Red Army 
must recruit 15,000 new soldiers in Kiangsi and Minhsi (western part 
of Fukien), 3, 000 in Hsiang-Kan (border area of Hunan and Kiangsi) , 
and 5,000 in Hsiang-O-Kan (border area of Hunan, Hupei, and Kian-
gsi); (2) the Party branches, the Communist Youth Corps, and labor 
associations of all levels, and all the mass organizations must organize 
"the Red Army Support Committees." The basic task of the committee 
was to engage in the recruitment of the Red Army soldiers, to recog-
nize the Red Army's services, to work for the Red Anny, to practice 
"regulations governing the preferential treatment for the Red Army," 
and to assist the familes of the Red Army soldiers. The committee 
23) "Hung-chiin wen-t'i chiieh·i·an su·ch'li ti-i-tz'u tai-piao ta·hui t'ung·kuo," 
in Chugoku kyosanto shi, Vol. 5, pp.±29-434. 
24) "Hung-chiin k'uo-ta wen-t'i chiieh -i -an chung-yang-chii (December 25)," 
in Chugoku kyosanto shi, Vol. 5, pp.32.8-:;;11. 
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must be put under the control of the General Political Depart-
ment of the Revolutionary Military Commission; (3) for the sake of 
the expansion of the Red Army, techniques of broad propaganda and 
agitation method must be utilized. In meetings, speeches, entertain-
ments, and dramas, the victories of the Red Army must be propagated. 
The masses must be persuaded to join the Red Army. However, com-
pulsory methods of recruitment may not be used. The voluntary joining 
of the Red Army may be recommended. In the work of the Red Army 
expansion, a strict class line must be maintained. People from landlord, 
rich peasant, and merchant class must not be allowed to enter the Red 
Army; (4) in the work of the Red Army expansion, efforts must be 
made to mobilize the masses and to have them assist the government's 
implementation of the resolutions governing preferential treatment for 
the Red Army; and (5) the members of the Party and corps must 
become the leaders of the Red Army expansion. They must work, as 
vanguards of the Red Army, for leading the worker and peasant masses 
so that the latter enter the Red Army.25l 
As indicated above, the techniques of mass mobilization was of pn-
mary importance in the expansion of the Red Army. The mass mobili-
zation was further strengthened, as the expansion campaigns progressed. 
In the instruction concerning the question of the Red Army expanSIOn, 
issued by the Central Executive Committee in September, 1932, the 
techniques of mass mobilization and political mobilization were further 
emphasized. The regime now ordered the reorganization and strength-
ening of the local armed forces. One can also find that the regime was 
moving toward the direction of adopting the conscription system rather 
25) Ibid. 
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than the volunteer system. 26 ) 
The techniques of mass mobilization in the expansion campaigns of 
the Red Army can be discussed in the following manner. The Commu-
nist leaders of the Kiangsi period decided that "all works must be 
subject to war and all energies must be concentrated on the clevelop-
ment and strengthening of the revolutionary v.rar."27) . To this end, the 
Communist leaders made efforts to expand the Red Army through pol~ 
itical mobilization. In this effort, they relied heavily Oil the method of 
propaganda and agitation, appealing to the revolutionary zeal of the 
masses. However, the method of persuation was regarded as more Im-
portant than that of compulsory order. In order to win the masses, the 
Communist leaders implemented a number of mobilization techniques. 
First, the Communist leaders decided it important to treat the Red 
Army soldiers and their families preferentially. A series of regulations 
governing the preferential treatment for them was promulgated, as will 
be discussed later. Second, the regime launched "the return- to - arm)' 
campaigns" to the Red Army men who had for some reason deviated 
from the service. Third, the regime prohibited the clecampment of the 
Red Army soldiers. Fourth, in order to promote the Red Army expan-
sion work, the Commuist leaders utilized the method of political propa-
ganda and education through various meetings such· as electorate meet-
ings, hsiang delegate meetings, and meetings of the Red Guards, Youth 
Vanguards, labor unions, and poor peasant corps. Fifth, they srength-
ened the organizations of the local armed forces. 
In December, 1933, the Central Military Committee of the CCP 
26) "Chung'yang chih-hsing wei·yiian-hui kuan·Yii k'uo-ta hung-chiin wcn·t'i 
hSiin-ling," HSCH, No. 34 (September 2'), 1932). 
27) Ibid. 
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launched a shock attack campaign (fu-chi )tiin-tung) of the Red Army 
expansion and ordered all units of the military to organize "dash teams 
(fu-chi tui) _" The Central Committee determined the number of the 
new recruits according to the population of each province under control. 
The Central Committee ordered the "dash teams" to recruit 25, 000 new 
soldiers in the entire Soviet district by the end of 1933: the Kiangsi 
province, 13, 400; the Fukien province, 4, 600; the Yi.iehkan province, 
4,000; the J uichin, 1, 500_ 28) 
The goal of the Red Army expansion campaIgns lay in the enlarge-
ment of the Red Army enrollment. Therefore, it is important to find 
out the total number of new recruits_ Unfortunately, however, only bits 
of information concerning it are found_ According to Mao Tse-tung in 
his report to the Second National Soviet Congress, approximately 20,000 
new soldiers had been recruited in some hsien of the central Soviet 
district during a month period of May, 1933_ Particularly, in Ch'ang-
kang hsiang of Kiangsi which was a model hsiang, 320 out of 407 male 
persons between sixteen to forty-five years of age had been recruited to 
the Red Army (80%) _ And in Shang-tsai-chi hsiang of Fukien which 
was also a model hsiang, 485 out of 554 male persons had been re-
cruited (88%) _ 29) Considering the fact that these two hsiang were models, 
one can presume that other areas did not meet the record of these 
two cases_ 
In an article in Hung-hsing Paa (Red Star Journal) of August,1934, 
28) "Chung-hua chlin-wei k'uo-ta hung-chlin fu-chi ylin-tung ti chi-hua," 
HSCH, 1\0_ 132 (December 5, 1933)_ 
29) Mao, "Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan-
hui yii jen-min wei-yiian-hui tui ti-erh-tz'u ch'lian-kuo su-wei-ai tai-piao 
ta-hui ti pao-kao_" 
C 134 :' 
it was reported that families of the Red Army soldiers had occupied 
over half of the total population. 30 ) From this information, one may 
assume that an overwhelming majority of male persons between sixteen 
to forty-five years of age had been recruited during the Kiangsi period. 
The shock attack campaigns of the Red Al'my expansion was quite 
successful, although the actual number of new recruits did not meet 
the planned number.3!) 
Again in Hung-hsing Paa of July, 1934, one may find statistics of 
the Red Army expansion from August, 1933, to July, 1934. 
Table I The Number of the Red Army's New Recruit' 
(August, 1~J33-· July, 1934) 
August, 1933 6,290 March 
September 5.S68 April 
October 2,211 May 
November 1,938 June 
December, 1933"" July 
January, 1934 23,253 Others 
February 5,865 Total 








As the Table I indicates, the number of new recruits was radically 
increased in December, 1933, and January, 1934, and April and May, 
1934. The radicd incrEz.se WJS due to the shock attack campaigns of 
the Red Army expansion. The degree of success of the shock attack 
campaigns varied from place to place. However, most successful places 
were Hsing-~;uo hsien and J uichin. 32, 
30) Liang Po·['ai, "Yu·hung kung·jso ti chien-yueh yli nei-pu ti . kung-tso," 
HU}ig-hsi1lg pao (Red StaT JournaI:, ~o. 57 (August 8, 1934>, p.5. 
3]) ';V'ang,Chu1lg-ktmg shih-kao, Vol. ~. p,487. 
32) "Kuan-yu chung-kuo kung·nung hung-chlin yu·tai t'iao'chien chlieh-i 
(:-Tovcmber, 1931)," in Ckugoku kyosanto ski, Vol. 5, pp.478-481. 
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During the Kiangsi period, the expansion campaigns of the I<.ed Army 
also affected the local armed forces. Although the total size of the local 
armed forces at this period is not known,' interesting statistics of the 
dash campaigns to expand the Red Guards and the Youth Vanguards 
is found in Tou·cheng. In February, 1934, the Kiangsi Communist 
regime launched a month and a half shock attack campaign to expand 
the Red Guards and the Youth Vanguards. The original goal for re-
cruitment and its result 'are as follows: 
Table II The Original Goal for Recruitment of the Red Guards and the 
Youth Vanguards (March 1, 193,j-April 15, 1934) 
Area The Red Guards 
Kiangsi 250, 000 
Yuehkan 50, DOD 
Fukien 50, DOD 
4,000 
10,000 I 








Total 361, 000 I 67,500 
,-------- ._._----,------------ ~~-

















Source: "I(uan·yii chung-yang su-ch'ii ch'ih-shao-tai t'll-chi ycltl-y:mg ti chuch-
tiug," Tau·cheng, No.49 (March 2, 193'1), p.3. 
As the Table II indicates, the regime bd originaily I ' pwnned to 
recruit 364,000 into the Red Guards, 67,500 ido the model battalions, 
340,500 into the Youth Vanguards and4l, DOG into the model battalions 
during -the shock attack campaigns to expand the local armed forces. 
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Table III The Result of Recruitment of the Red Guards and the Youth 






















~__________ __ ~I_~h~_~-~~~~ Van~~~~~~ __ J ____ ~o~:l Battalion ___ = 
Kiangsi 47.596 64.1% 
Fukien 82.7 114.4 
Yiiehkan 79.2 83.8 
Juichin 119,4 101.5 
Chienlitai 115.6 73.2 
-------
Source: "Ch'ih-shao-tuit'u-chi yiin-tung ti tsung-chieh yu hung _ wu-yiieh 
tung-yuan," Tau-cheng, No. 57 (April 28, 193-1), p. l. 
According to the Table III, about 90 percent of the original plan was 
achieved. This was a higher achievement compared with other expansion 
campaigns of the Red Armv. 
With the launching of a series of the Red Army expansIOn cam-
paigns, the Communist leaders decided it necessary to gain support from 
the Red Army soldiers and their families_ As explained above, there 
developed a policy of gaining support from the rank and file of the Red 
Army and their families. It was the policy of preferential treatment 
for the Red Army soldiers' families. 
In the Red Army expansion movement, the Communist leaders uti-
lized not only the policy of preferential treatment for the Red Army 
soldiers' families but the policies of prevention of escape from the mil-
itary service and of "the return-to-the-Army." However, it was in the 
preferential treatment policy that methods of gaining support from the 
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masses were most applied. 
The policy of preferential treatment for the Red Army soldiers and 
their families was first decided in the First National Soviet Congress 
of November, 1931, when the Congress adopted the "Regulations 
Governing the Preferential Treatment for the Chinese \Vorkers' and 
Peasants' Red Army." 33; Again in January, 193,1, the Central 
Committee of the CCP and Central People's Committee jointly 
reached a decision on the preferential treatment for the Red Army 
soldiers' families and in February, the Central People's Committee 
issued a "Regulation Governing the Preferential Treatment for the Red 
Army Soldiers' Families. 33 ) This regulation was a kind of supplementary 
provision to the January decision and the "Saturday Regulations Gov-
erning the Preferential Treatment for the Red Army Soldiers'Families" 
which was also adopted in January, 1934. And in February, 1934, the 
Central People's Committee promulgated a supplementary "Ploughing 
Team Regulation Governing the Red Army Soldiers' Families." In any 
case, with issuance of a series of regulations governing the preferential 
treatment for the Red Army soldiers' families, a number of privileges 
were given to the families of the Red Army soldiers. 
The policy of preferential treatment for the Red Army families were 
of course designed to arouse support from the masses, since by 1934 
the majority of the population under Communist control consisted of 
the Red Army, families. The following is a review of some important 
privileges which were enjoyed by the families. 
First, the Red Army families during the soldiers' active serVlce were 
33) "Yu'tai hung-chlin chia-hsu t'iao-li (February 8, LSJJi)." in ibid., Vol. 
7, pp. 110-11:1. 
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provided with labor f(FCe for ploughing, if the families had no laboring 
power or were lacking it. For this purpose, the government organized 
"ploughing teams," consisting of persons of ages between sixteen and 
fifty-five, "sundry work teams" that helped the Red Army families with 
sundry works, and. "inspection teams." The inspection teams were 
supposed to investigate the life of the soldiers' families and to super-
vise the implementation of the preferential treatment for the Red Ar-
my families. 34) 
Second, during the soldiers' active serVice, the families were exempt 
from all taxes levied by tIle Soviet government. 35) Third, during the 
soldiers' active servise, children of the soldiers were free from all edu-
cational fees. 36 ) Fourth, the Red Army soldiers' families could buy any 
goods from government owned shops and cooperatives at a discount rate 
of 5 percent. 37) 
In order to imrlement the policy and work of the preferential treat-
ment for the Reel Ar:ny families, the Soviet government· established 
special sections (I.t all levels of administration. These sections worked 
in close coordination ".iih the CCP, the Red Guards, the Youth Van-
guards, and the IIlass orgi'nizatioDs such f1S poor peasant corps. In short, 
the preferential tTe~(t;nent for the P,ed Army soldiers' families was a 
policy to mobili;7c m,(~ "[itatc the Inasses so that they would support 
tho. c,ovie"j· S~,7,....tr::~r:l 33) \".".... ~_ l. • .• ,.~ \. ~~ • 
') 1\,' 
,) ~) "Ya·lai llUl'g-r:h:;n chi;l-bsll keng-t'ien-tui t'iao·li(February 8, 1934)," 111 
ib.'d" pp. 111- HS. 
HY-:~l-'i'aj l:n:i,lg-chjn chia-h:SLL t'i:lo-li:" .Axe. Z. 
Jo) "Kuan-yU chung-kao kung-nung Lung-chi"lll yu-taii:'iao-chien chucb-i 




Ibid., Art. 11. 
"Kuan-yi'l k'uo-ta hung-chlin ti ckreh-i," Tou-cheng, No. 19 (July 25, 
I [)"')' ? h _'-' ~)d), P? '-,J-".J. 
?vlilitary Organizations and Mass Mobilization C 139 J 
v. Conclusion 
During the Chinese Soviet Republic, the Communisb attempted to 
secure the support of local masses for the preservation ii nd the expan-
sion of the Soviet system. In fact, this was only possible when the 
masses give their support to the system. For the Communists at that 
time, the fundamental question of a revolution was to seize the reigns 
of government. Faced with a series of the "encirclement" campalgns 
launched by the KMT forces, the realistic and primary goal of the 
Communists was the destruction of the KMT forces. And this had to 
be achieved prior to the realization of a socialist revolution uilder the 
proletarian dictatorship which was their long term goal. Therefore, all 
efforts of the Communists were placed upon the realization of the short 
term goal. 
The Communists came to realize that their short term goal could be 
only achieved through revolutionary warfare and class struggle. To 
achieve this goal, they had to mobilize the masses and then to have 
the mobilized masses join the Red Army_ In the mobilization of t108 
masses and the subsequent building of the army, the Communists had 
to rely on the principle of the mass line_ 'Ne have not discussed the 
mass line as such. However, it was the principle of leadership as well 
as the method of mass mobilization. \Vithout it, the expansion move-
ment of the Red Army would have not succeeded. After the Long March, 
tbe Communists changed their initial policies of armed insurrection 
(revolutionary warfare) and agrarian revolution (class struggle) in favor 
of an anti-Japanese united front and a new domocracy. However, this 
dicl not mean that the organizational techniques of the Communist::; 
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during the Kiangsi period had failed. 
First of all, the expansion movement of the Red Army was a suc-
cess in itself. The Communists were able to mobilize illl overwhelming 
majority of the local male adults into the Red Army. Second, the or-
ganizational principle of the mass line developed during the Kiangsi era 
became one of the foundations of the Communist politics in the Yenan 
and the post-1949 period. Third, the adoption of the anti-Japanese 
united front did not mean that the Communists gave up their revolu-
tionary strategy of armed insurrection. In fact, the great contribution 
of the Kiangsi period was the discovery of concrete methods for linking 
mass mobilization, and therefore participation, with the expansion of 
the Red Army and subsequently with the guerrilla warfare. Without 
the organizational techniques of the Red Army, the Communists might 
have been completely annihilated by the fifth "encirclement" campaign 
of the KMT forces and even the Long March would perhaps have 
never been possible. 
"Political power grows out of a barrel of a gun." This is an often 
quoted famous dictum of Mao Tse-tung. M.ao must have learned this 
even before the establishment of the Chinese Soviet Republic. Without 
the successful Red Army expansion through mass mobilization, how-
ever, Mao would have not gained "a barrel of a gun" sufucient to pre-
serve the Soviet system. In spite of a series of setbacks and subsequent 
changes of their policies, there is no doubt that the techniques of mil-
itary organizations and the policies of the Red Army expansion devel-
oped during the. Kiangsi era provided the Communists with a precious 
experience which finally paved the way for the survival and victory 
of Communism in China. 
